深度｜基于价值公平分配的电力市场竞争机制设计

4 结语

本文提出基于价值公平分配的电力市场竞争机制,应用于电力日前市场,并理论证明该机制满足激励相容、个体理性以及系统成本最小化的性质。基于IEEE30节点和118节点的算例分析表明:①在价值公平分配机制下,所有发电机组申报真实成本为占优策略,即价值公平分配机制满足激励相容;②参与日前市场的所有发电机组的净利润不小于0,即价值公平分配机制满足个体理性;③价值公平分配机制引起的收支不平衡可通过事后调整发电机组收益来解决。

在未来的研究中,以下三方面值得进一步探索:①本文仅考虑发电侧竞价的日前市场机制设计,实际电力市场允许负荷侧参与竞价,因此,在未来研究中可探索价值公平分配机制在双边竞价市场中的适用性;②本文重点关注价值公平分配机制如何满足激励相容,即发电机组的占优策略为申报真实成本,在未来研究中可对比价值公平分配机制和边际电价机制纳什均衡解的差异;③本文提出通过降低发电侧收益的收支平衡策略,在未来的研究中可分析提高负荷侧电价的解决方案。

本文的研究成果将为中国电力体制改革提供满足激励相容的电力市场竞争机制,积极推动中国电力市场的健康发展。

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王剑晓^1,2,钟海旺^1,2,夏 清^1,2,汪 洋³,赖晓文³,郭新志⁴

(1.清华大学电机工程与应用电子技术系,北京市 100084;

2.电力系统及发电设备控制和仿真国家重点实验室(清华大学),北京市 100084;

3.北京清能互联科技有限公司,北京市 100084;4.国网河南省电力公司经济技术研究院,河南省郑州市 450000)

王剑晓(1992—),男,博士研究生,主要研究方向:电力市场、发电计划、电力规划、新能源预测 等。E-mail:wangjx14@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn

钟海旺(1986—),男,通信作者,博士,副教授,博士生导师,IEEE高级会员,主要研究方向:电力市场、需求侧响应、发电计划等。E-mail:zhonghw@tsinghua.edu.cn

夏 清(1957—),男,教授,博士生导师,IEEE 高 级 会员,主要研究方向:智能电网、发电计划、电力规划、电力市场、负荷预测等。E-mail:qingxia@tsinghua.edu.cn